As a result, the left alternative to Russian oligarchic capitalism has been excluded from the start. History and politics converge in many ways. First, current politics is a historical phenomenon itself. It is informed by history and based upon historic antecedents. Its claims to historic continuity form an important part of its legal continuity.
The goals it poses today become events or failures of tomorrow. Second, history enters politics via the medium of political culture. Finally, national history is a privileged reservoir of national identity. Identity is made of history as much as it is made of desire. When history and desire collide, they spawn the phenomenon of usable history: that is, historical narratives that serve political purpose.
While Soviet style internationalists lose ground, nationalist visions of all sorts accept prominence. Hence, the crisis of Russian national consciousness continues, receiving new boosts from the very attempts to alleviate it. The chapter argues that the idea of a confederate East Slavic Union could indeed be approached as a workable policy blueprint under the conditions of decentralization and full equality of the participants.
Both value systems are approached as ideal-typical constructions. Since the country had long been devoid of independent national statehood, its political culture developed features of dependency and parochialism. It has grown as a political culture of a stateless nation, as patterns of power-related behavior were constructed through a complex adjustment to the exogenous sources of authority.
Fragmentation, in turn, fostered localism, parochialism, and dependency. It also prevented national consolidation and thwarted ambitions of would-be nation builders. An ethnically ascriptive identity promulgated by the government simply does not work in a good half of the country.
Perhaps, it will—in the future—however, the price, in the form of further estrangement of citizenry form already not too popular government, may prove prohibitive well before the desired future comes. The last chapter looks at the problem of Russia, Ukraine, and the West. It pays special attention to the security implications of Russian-Ukrainian relations and analyzes the divergent attitudes to the idea of deeper integration within the framework of the CIS.
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This book does not pretend to write a comprehensive history of Ukrainian-Russian relations or to exhaust the topic of their political cultures and national identities. Its notion of political culture owes more to the history than to the survey research. Soviet studies followed bigger trends in social and political sciences. Theories of political culture had to accommodate intellectual fashions that accompanied periods of dominance of the totalitarian school, developmental models, modernization theory, interest group theory, and so on.
Decision makers do not take the political culture of a bygone polity into consideration. However, the issue resurfaced before too long. As new unexpected problems blocked the political and economic liberalization of the former Soviet states, the search for the mechanism of inertia started in earnest. In the postcommunist world, national governments preside over a grandiose attempt at social engineering, which involve immense international resources.
The radiant capitalist future did not materialize. International aid only increased the outstanding portion of national debt. Reformed communists returned to the parliaments in Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus, using the very mechanism of free, contested elections they had opposed for so long.
Large sections of the former nomenklatura stayed in power, national executives donned bureaucratic-authoritarian garbs, and more or less pronounced regimes of oligarchic dominance of society have been established. The liberal-democratic dream all but evaporated. Why did it happen? A frequently cited answer is the political culture. It is often viewed as a reservoir of stability and a force of inertia that curtails and molds the process of change. Human culture is that link between the past and the future that pierces the present, making it very much what it is.
Political culture serves as a template for contemporary practices and institutions: not only in the realm of politics per se, but everywhere the relations of authority are involved. Yet, there is more to political culture than inertia and continuity. As a historical phenomenon, it is prone to change. When its inertial side prevails, it obstructs social transformation. Conversely, when political culture itself 20 Political Culture and National Identity in Russian-Ukrainian Relations undergoes rapid changes, the change in the society must be accelerated.
On the other hand, there are those who, drawing on the insights of the totalitarian school in Sovietology, seek the root of all the present ills in the communist legacy of the country. If the change could be achieved so quickly, political culture must not be regarded solely as a reservoir of stability. We should see it rather as both a result and a vehicle of social and political transformations.
Both sides to the debate have concentrated their attention on the autocratic and antidemocratic elements of Russian political culture. No recurring patterns of dominance and servility were found on the Russian side. Gibson, Arthur H. Miller, Nicolai N. Petro, William M.
Reisinger, Richard Sakwa, and others came to the conclusion that democratic values and love of freedom form an important part of Russian political culture. Historical accounts emphasized the traditionally mitigating role of the Russian Orthodox Church and presented evidence of a subdominant but nevertheless viable protodemocratic tradition. Together with other studies of mass society, it provides a useful tool in the analysis of the concrete preconditions and mechanisms of social atomization, politically forced mobilization, state control, manipulation of culture symbols, and exploitation of instrumental rationality.
Berdiaev, G. Fedotov, or S. Admiration of force and the tradition to obey authorities were rightly or wrongly cited as Russian national characteristics. Underdevelopment of civil society, weakness of constitutional tradition, autocracy, and the absence of a dialogue between the state and the public were all seen as leading to a new-age despotism.
Exile writers noted that the Russian masses tended to switch from the periods of mindless obedience to the spontaneous upheavals and riots that almost certainly only helped to excuse repeated brutality of the powers-that-were. The postrevolutionary dictatorship was described as a logical, though unfortunate, continuation of this centuries-old tradition. This implied the existence of two irreconcilable cultures, none of which could claim a nation-wide acceptance. Yet, the elite bias of mainstream Sovietology remained.
When applied to Soviet realities, decision-making models were usually narrowed to a picture of competing, bargaining, and occasionally collaborating elites ultimately responsible for sometimes erratic and sometimes consistent policies. A new focus on decision-making and policy implementation in complex organizations led researchers to acknowledge the internal diversity of the Soviet elite and the respective variety of its several organizational, if not political, cultures.
The elite and mass reactions to this predicament were described as mutually reinforcing. Terror, domination, and propaganda alone, or even all of these taken together, cannot by themselves account for the prevalent mood of the time. This ground had been prepared by wars, revolutions, and pogroms that constituted a larger part of early twentieth-century Russian history.
The behaviorist revolution was fed by the use of advanced quantitative methods, most notably survey research and statistical analysis. First, the class nature of the Soviet society in Weberian terms of social status, prestige, and life chances had been established. Second, the discovery of informal behavior and organizations disproved the previously unquestioned image of a totalitarian monolith based on coercive mobilization.
While the Harvard project had been most concerned with the class or quasi-class nature of the Soviet society, the second study of a comparable range, the Soviet Interview Project SIP , delved deeper into the attitudes and value structures. The youngest and the best educated were not inclined to admit the priority of the state power over individual rights and civil liberties or to concur in the state control of the economy.
The Soviet system, like many others, is syncretic, adapting traditional clientilist modes to what appears to be institutions for democratic participation. Research questions centered around such issues as alienation and support, participation, political and interpersonal trust, tolerance, deference to authorities, valuation of liberty, and rights consciousness. Researchers discovered widespread support of democratic values, concluding that the enduring patterns of political behavior gave way to the newly evolved prodemocratic patterns.
Behaviorist projects do not exhaust the whole spectrum of political culture research. The so-called interpretivist explanations, which emphasize historic interpretation and other hermeneutic methods, are well represented in communist and postcommunist studies. Studies of the Russian national character and social psychology of Russian intelligentsia by Nikolai Berdiaev, S.
Bulgakov, S. Frank, P. Savitskii, N. Trubetskoi, and associates; and the ideas of the Parisian Novyi grad group G. Fedotov and others all bear direct relevance to the present discussions. The latest wave of emigration from the former Soviet Union brought new works in this genre, though of a lesser academic value and often harmed by their excessively aggressive anti-Russian bias.
Interpretivists do not engage in a value-neutral, nonnormativist analysis precisely because a good measure of subjectivity is required by the canons of the genre. Still, naked subjectivism will not be excused either. The accepted subjectivity is not that of an interpreter, but that of the people who are dealt with in the study. What seems meaningful to an external observer may be less meaningful, or not meaningful, in the same way to the observed. Behaviorists operationalize political meaning through the 28 Political Culture and National Identity in Russian-Ukrainian Relations values, attitudes, and opinions held by the citizenry.
Historians look for meaning in broad historical trends and landmark events. Anthropologists seek it in the rites, the rituals, and the customs of a society. Social psychologists tend to uncover it in patterns of collective interaction and group behavior, which may not be self-consciously recognized by participants. The problem is further complicated by inevitable variances of meaning on the side of the agent.
Looking at how meaning is constructed helps to understand, what meaning is. A third way is informed by phenomenology. Oleg Kharkhordin draws on Michel Foucault to examine the role of communist rituals and practices of surveillance in creation of the Soviet individual. Quantitative sociology misses a great deal of information on meaning creation, conveyance, and restructuring.
Hence, the meaning of liberty in Russia must not necessarily repeat its American reading, and the latter itself changes over time, expanding into previously uncovered or even untouchable areas. The concept of political culture usually refers to a nation state. Subnational units are thought of as supporting subcultures at best. If so, political culture must be seen as a political representation of the whole national system of culture. National values enter political culture and form its important constitutive part.
These values mirror the political, the social, and the ethnic history of the people. When people are united by a common language, common traditions and customs, and a collective consciousness and shared identity, 30 Political Culture and National Identity in Russian-Ukrainian Relations we see their collective culture in terms of ethnicity.
Surprisingly, political culture studies rarely make ethnic values a separate, conceptually distinct object of analysis. As a result, these two problem areas are seldom brought together and assessed against each other. Neither Sovietology nor more recent research in postcommunist politics could develop the linkage in a methodologically rigorous manner.
Communist nationality policy was presented as a simple continuation of the Russian imperialist expansion and subjugation of the conquered peoples. This evaluation was seemingly in line with observations of the national and social struggle in the non-Russian periphery, where local communists, often outnumbered by better-entrenched formations of the propertied classes, had to rely on the aid of the Moscow-directed Red Army in their bid for national hegemony. Smenovekhovstvo had its logic, which reverberated with the traditional worldview of the Russian statists.
No doubt there was some sympathetic audience among the Bolsheviks, too. However, this was not an authentic Bolshevist program. These people appealed not so much to the Soviet government as to their fellow emigrants. They encouraged collaboration with the communists, seeing the ruling party as a legitimate promoter of the Russian national cause. If Bolsheviks had simply embraced the traditional political culture of the Russian imperial elite, there would have been no reason for them to deviate from the unitary model of the state whatsoever. The phenomenon of national Bolshevism was really created by the national-minded leaders of the non-Russian communist parties and the national minority cadres of the Russian Communist Party Bolshevik RKP[b].
By taking this position, they moved closer to the leftist Ukrainian nationalists than to the Orthodox Marxists of the RKP b intellectual core. As the Ukrainian socialist leader Volodymyr Vynnychenko observed, both opposing camps in Ukrainian politics of the time had proven 32 Political Culture and National Identity in Russian-Ukrainian Relations to be wrong. Nationalists tended to elevate the national over the social to the complete disregard of the latter, whereas socialists mistakenly saw the task of national liberation as second-rate, if not altogether irrelevant to the task of social emancipation.
Presenting the Soviet regime as a hollow shell for Russian domination and imperialism misrepresents the facts. From the standpoint of communist ideology, ethnicity was but a nuisance that had to be controlled, while it existed, in anticipation of its eventual disappearance in the future. In its attempt to equalize the living conditions of the working masses, the party disregarded Russian national interests no less, if not more, than the national interests of other subjects of the federation.
Production of consumer goods per capita was higher in all of the European nonRussian republics, except Georgia and Azerbaijan. In the last years of Soviet rule light industry in Russia produced fewer goods than in Belarus, Georgia, or Moldova, let alone the Baltics or Armenia, which had been more than two times more productive than Russia. Residents of Estonia, Latvia, and Georgia enjoyed better access to health care facilities, while Russia had less doctors per ten thousand inhabitants than any of these republics.
The situation was conducive to the inception of nationalist mobilization, which started to unfold as soon as the strict controls of Russian national feelings imposed by the communist state were slackened. Deviant discourses were silenced, whether they drew on the past or on the unlicensed visions of the future. Artistic and philosophical liberalism followed. Both prerequisites were lost in the communist Russia. The culture that appeared as a result was not motivated by a Russian national idea: neither in its form if we believe the culture to be wider than its linguistic shell , nor in its content.
The use of Russian language for the purposes of administration of a multinational state was not motivated by conscious desire to promote Russian national values. While the imperial bureaucrats could meaningfully employ the notion of Russian national interest, the Soviet communists could not. The very depth of Soviet transformation marked a profound shift in the culture and identity of the people.
To what extent is the discussion of continuity in either political or ethnic culture possible under such circumstances? Second, continuity must not be universal. Certain aspects of a political system or certain varieties of behavior have no precedent in the past. Of course, this is not to say that behavior informed by these principles is completely alien to the population at large. The point, rather, is that the political culture of the elite may or may not penetrate to the depth of the popular body, and its level of acceptance varies from one stratum to another.
Since Russians lagged behind such European nationalities as Ukrainians or Estonians in the degree of national development achieved before the revolution, they proved more open Political Culture and Nationality 35 to denationalization.
However, even in this case the regime could not succeed in eliminating either the national identity of the people or their desire of national self-realization. Political-cultural continuity may or may not bring about any particular succession in nationality policies. Parallels between the past and the present should always be drawn with great caution, especially when a revolution or other turmoil of equal magnitude completely changes established ways of life.
No policy pertaining to the national development of the Russians themselves had been ever devised or thought of. Uvarov, in the midnineteenth century, had little to do with nationalism per se. It was rather a belated attempt to reinvigorate a medieval sense of unity between the monarch and the people, prompted by the Orthodox tradition of close association between spiritual and worldly powers. Modern understanding of nationality had not been introduced en masse before the advent of Soviet power, and nationality policies in the Soviet Union were in many respects started from scratch.
This point should be remembered to avoid a not-uncommon confusion between nationalism and traditionalism or between proper nationalist and premodern forms of xenophobia. Contemporary scholarship sees nationalism as a product of modernization, and Russia has not experienced a normal, fullblown modernization until very recently.
But there is no evidence to support 36 Political Culture and National Identity in Russian-Ukrainian Relations the idea of a longstanding Russian hatred of other nations, while there is much evidence to the contrary, including that of continuous incorporation of non-Russian elites into the ranks of the Russian ruling strata, unimpeded social mobility of non-Russians throughout most of the imperial and practically the whole of the Soviet eras, virtual absence of systemic discrimination against non-Russians or crimes motivated by ethnic hatred, widespread intermarriages, mutual acculturation, and so on.
A certain negative continuity in Russian national development does exist. Czarist imperial supranationalism was followed by communist denationalization and then by the national humiliation of the postcommunist transition. National identity was further diluted by Soviet socialist cosmopolitanism. Ideological distinctions aside, authoritarian regimes in Russia had put the state before and above the nation—an archaic pattern that national revolutions in the West successfully undid. Thus, the Russians never developed a national identity, except as the dominant part of a greater Russian empire.
Even the famous Slavophiles versus Westernizers debate of the nineteenth century was not couched in explicitly national terms. Neither were its distant reminiscences of the early postperestroika period. Their nationalist opponents, be it on the left Ziuganov or on the right Zhirinovsky , once again focused on the state and made few direct ethnic commitments. Cultural conservatives attempted to resuscitate Slavophilism. Back to the nineteenth century, it is hardly appropriate to present original Slavophiles as nationalists.
The Slavophile idea of nationality was nothing like its contemporary European nationalist concept. The pan-Slavic movement was precisely the opposite of the modernizing ventures of its contemporaries—nationalist movements in East Central Europe. If the tension is too obvious to ignore, it is usually interpreted as a technical economic problem, not to be assessed from a vantage point of the national interest.
Liberalism in Russia remains inescapably elitist, which hinders its growth and transformation into a national force. To sum up, neither czarism nor communism were able to develop a distinctly pro-Russian nationality policy or showed any sign of being sincerely interested in such. The net result of Soviet nationality policies, as applied to Russia and the Russians, was clearly detrimental to the growth of national consciousness. For many Soviet studies specialists, Ukraine was but a shadow of Russia. Culture can survive without the state, even in a generally adverse environment.
In a number of cases, the social mobility of ethnic minorities is at least comparable, if not surpasses, the social mobility of politically dominant nationalities. Ethnic diasporas in North America, Australia, and elsewhere have achieved remarkable levels of integration into their host societies.
For more historically distant examples, one may think of the Chinese seashore traders of the Indian Ocean littoral or of Jewish merchants in early capitalist Europe. Ukrainians, as no other people, were intimately connected with the structures of power in Moscow czardom, the Russian Empire, and the Soviet Union. Historically, the Ukrainian aristocratic families—Razumovskie, Vyshnevetskie, Skoropadskie, Glinki, and others—were highly visible in the upper echelons of Russian nobility. Ukrainian Orthodox monasteries remained strongholds of the Orthodox faith and raised a number of Russian church leaders and ideologues.
Ukraine had its own capitalists of indigenous ethnic origin: Rodzyanki, Tereshchenki, and Symyrenki being the most prominent. Ukrainians constituted the weighty proportion of the Red Army brass; a KGB career starting in Ukraine and ending in Moscow was not exceptional either. We shall never be able to avoid them completely, since historical interpretation is by necessity a subjective present reading of the things past.
While some facts are deemed relevant others are discarded, depending on the research agenda, frame of reference, ideology, and ethics. There are several distinct explanations of Soviet nationality policies. The earliest accounts saw all policies originating from Moscow or Saint Petersburg as essentially motivated by base impulses of the Great Russian chauvinism. The writers of this persuasion tended to equate political hegemony with national oppression and disregarded the elaborate politics of alliances that made the very existence of both the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union possible.
Continuous incorporation of the non-Russian elites by the imperial center was largely ignored, as were the facts of intricate power sharing between the central and the republican elites that jointly populated all branches of the Soviet communist hierarchy, importantly including its repressive organs. According to Arendt, ideological conformity is crucial for the very existence of totalitarian regimes.
Ideological pronouncements of the communist regime must never be taken at their face value. Divergence between the words and the deeds was commonplace, as was the lack of concurrence between behavior and institutions. Nationalism does not have to go hand in hand with religion and is often constituted as a fully secular phenomenon. When a religion does play a role in modern national mobilization, the less ethnocentric this role is, the better for the society.
Religious ethnocentrism is narcissistic, overbearing, and abusive of its own faithful, not to mention explicitly xenophobic and implicitly aggressive. Here national culture has been inspired by religion for over one thousand years and therefore a symbiosis of religion and nationality is taken for granted. Religion, in principle, tends to identify with ethnic nationalism. The question cannot be satisfactorily answered if religion is treated as an independent variable.
It was further developed in a vision of competing rational actors engaged in distinct organizational processes and bureaucratic feuds. This methodology, which prevailed for several decades, impeded comparative research in Soviet nationality politics. The situation changed with the collapse of the Soviet Union.
Rational choice and familiar problems of collective action determined direction and substance of the autonomy struggles on several territorialadministrative levels of the former federation. The single rational actor model was no longer applicable to this new reality, which could be better described as the interaction between multiple rational actors—each with its own ethno-political strategy and each scrambling for scarce resources inherited from the fallen superpower and new prospects for development dependent on the benevolent attitude of the West.
Even the mobilized and territorially concentrated Ukrainian community in Trans-Dniester failed to realize its ambitions in full. The next model of nationality politics is based on the use of socialeconomic and political-organizational factors as independent variables. It may be called realist or social-determinist. They view political culture and national identity as historically determined, relational, yet lasting patterns of social interaction. However, she does not ascribe an unconditionally positive or indeed any unambiguous value to the process. She would not agree to the Deutschean claim that social mobilization is necessarily accompanied by national assimilation.
Idiosyncrasies of local situation and history of previous development always condition modernization outcomes. In contradistinction to the assumptions of political-cultural continuity, the realist view denies any idea of longstanding ethnic animosities. Nationalist mobilizations in post-Soviet countries have been more often prompted by the short-term utility considerations. Political Culture and Nationality 45 More recent developments brought new attention to the role of nationalism in international politics. Several theorists see nationalism as a particular solution to the security dilemma of weak and immature states.
The breakup of the USSR and the violent collapse of Yugoslavia left many newly independent states without viable institutions of governance and the others in disarray. In the absence of mature civil society, religion and nationalism emerge as prime candidates for the role. If nationalism is related to security, its intensity is directly proportional to the level of uncertainty in interstate relations and inversely proportional to the achieved level of interstate and interethnic trust. Judging by these parameters, Russian-Ukrainian relations do not represent the worst-case scenario.
Trust is a consumable commodity: if it is not continuously replenished, it may dry out quickly. A redrawn history can alienate once-friendly nations more than their passing trade disputes, disagreements on foreign policy, or renegotiated borders. Most of these explanatory models, with the exception of the last one, are equally applicable to both Soviet and post-Soviet periods. While each captures some part of a complex, multidimensional relationship between several variables that make national politics what it is, no singular approach can be considered exhaustive.
Yet, some of them can grow more popular than the others and appear to dominate both academic and popular discourses for the 46 Political Culture and National Identity in Russian-Ukrainian Relations time being. The imperial paradigm in particular has been recently reborn in a number of studies that see Russia as an imperial heir par excellence. In light of this paradigm, it is seductive to see Ukraine as a former imperial periphery recuperating from centuries of subjugation. This interpretation is countered by studies that see postcommunist nationalism as a recent product of social construction or as a political resource used by elites and movement entrepreneurs to buttress their respective power claims against competition and to secure mass following inside and broader international acceptance outside the country.
Finally, empire might simply mean political domination of one or several countries by a hegemonic power that can exercise leadership without necessarily rewarding itself with pecuniary gain. Otherwise, the metaphor of an empire remains just that, a metaphor posing as a theory. It is not always clear which of the aforementioned meanings of empire is engaged in this or that instance. Failure to clarify the notion collapses its several meanings into one, thus stretching the concept beyond the limits of its academically stringent application. In one move, Soviet communist despotism, which equally oppressed all nationalities of the country, becomes synonymous with Russian ethnic domination.
In another case, political domination is equated with economic exploitation. Ideologically driven goals of the regime are treated as Russian national aspirations. A much-reiterated hypothesis of unequal exchange between the Russian Federation and the rest of the republics, presumably disadvantaged in the process, has not been borne out by empirical evidence. Postcommunist Russian nationalism has grown in no small extent out of the recognition of this fact. The hypothesis of the ethnic division of labor has not been proven either.
The structure of ethnic representation in political and administrative posts, management, science, and culture approximated relative weights of each group in the whole population of the country. They were less than proportionately represented in regional and central committees of party 48 Political Culture and National Identity in Russian-Ukrainian Relations organizations in the Union republics and were in no position to control decision making in the republics.
In most cases, coethnics who cut their political teeth in various positions of prominence in their respective home republics rule post-Soviet states. Even if empirical evidence is inconclusive, however, metaphors are still able to shape discourse, and academic discourse is no exception. The imperial hypothesis, popular with the students of nationalism in the former Soviet Union, sees the Soviet collapse as the disintegration of an oppressive imperial system.
Seeing the USSR as an empire and Russia as an imperial inheritor often sets a key for interpretations of post-Soviet nationality policies. Russia has been systematically called upon to mediate between the warring parties. Revolutions do not follow liberal-democratic procedures. Democracy appears reserved for representatives of titular nationality. It must be noted that, were the Soviet Union such a hotbed of national tensions that nothing short of revolution could remedy the problem, it would have collapsed long ago.
State repression, however massive and crude, proves a weak barrier against the wrath of nations. Several observers noted that the Soviet regime made Russians pay a dear price for the political leadership they assumed in the Soviet Union. So too are those that view Russians as the hegemonic group and all non-Russians as equally oppressed colonial subjects.
However, this assumption is impossible to prove on the basis of known evidence. There were no such restrictions on promotion of non-Russians residing in the Russian Federation. If nationalists succeed in procuring some electoral support, the explanation, once again, is the imperial nostalgia of the voters. It is expected that the country will be driven by nationalists to claim its former imperial possessions back. The project of national consolidation pursued by these states gives prime of place to the rights of a titular nationality or a dominant ethnic group. Guided by these rules, the nationality policy of a newly independent state exhibits openly assimilationist intentions toward ethnic minorities.
It becomes a nationalizing policy, the one that is ultimately inspired by a vision of ethno-cultural 52 Political Culture and National Identity in Russian-Ukrainian Relations homogenization of culturally and ethnically diverse population, or, should this goal prove remote, aims at ethno-political restructuring of society to assure dominant position of state-bearing nationality throughout.
Quite the contrary. The real-world administrative practices and professional and business regulations guided by the imperatives of a nationalizing project can factually annul the law, however well meant. Pervasive corruption and disdain of the law is another. By now, familiar twists and turns in foreign policy—expectedly pro-Russian before the elections and in times of crisis, and invariably anti-Russian once the problems are over—can be considered the third. Not only ethnic Russians are made to feel the burden of nativization. Arel, in several works, points out that linguistic divisions in Ukraine should be perceived as more salient than ethnic divisions.
Taras Kuzio has doubted the usefulness of the concept for comparative political analysis and its applicability to the postcommunist Ukraine in particular. The republican authorities determine school curricula and support national historiography, which need not coincide with the Russian one. The collective rights of ethnic minorities in Russia are insti- Political Culture and Nationality 55 tutionalized via territorial autonomy and home rule, which is precisely what ethnic minorities in other successor states lack—or are plainly denied by the governments.
Though nationality policies in Russia are subject to many abuses of bureaucratic nature, nationalizing zeal is not among them. The situation may change, however, if ethnocentric Russian nationalists win over the masses and are able to control the executive and legislative politics in Moscow. As for the principal coincidence of religion and nationalism, they are obviously capable of mutually reinforcing each other. Secular nationalism is commonplace. Ideologically deterministic assumptions are prone to fatalism and tend to essentialize most ephemeral side of human practices—their intersubjective and rhetorically manifested aspects.
Behaviorist and institutionalist models are good at elucidating domestic sources of these policies and help to suggest institutional checks that can be put on them to prevent human rights violation and preserve interethnic peace. It helps to see nationalism as a power resource in its own right, which politicians and movement entrepreneurs commonly use in pursuit of rather mundane objectives of organizational control, besmirching of opponents, and personal aggrandizement.
The result, as public choice theorists so convincingly demonstrate, proves detrimental to everyone. The model is instrumental in studies of ethno-political competition in a multinational state, but also helps to explain lackluster fortunes of such multilateral institutions as the CIS or the lack of vigor behind other regional formations in Eastern Europe. Realist approaches seek the roots of nationalism in social and economic change, accompanied by sweeping political and institutional developments that make nationalist strategies of social advancement attractive to certain groups and actors.
International relations theory sees nationalism as a product of interna- Political Culture and Nationality 57 tional communication, particularly in relations between states that share a common history and reciprocal security concerns. This is undoubtedly relevant to the present state of Ukrainian-Russian relations. Historical allusions play a major part in the shaping of the post-Soviet national identities in both countries.
The link between nation-building processes and historical memories in Russia and Ukraine will be discussed in the chapters that follow. Neither can they reveal themselves as an inherent, but temporarily obscured feature of an ethnic community. However, they can be constructed and changed in a complex process of social interaction involving both domestic and foreign players.
In some aspects, a foreign connection is even more important than the domestic one. Identity is always a relational quality, and national identity is no exception. People claiming to be a nation must see themselves as sharing something in common, and others—as having no part in it.
To develop a national consciousness, a group of people sharing common territory, economy, language, and presumably ancestry, has to be surrounded by other nations or nationsin-the-making. This goes a long way to explain why there were no nations in the world of medieval principalities and multiethnic empires. This reconstruction had to account for the international failure of the Warsaw Pact and Comecon in no lesser way than for the domestic failure of party-dominated regimes and command-administrative economies.
Ex-communist nations sought new identities and therefore new benchmarks to construct them. Their visions were as relational now as they were before, but both the nature and the direction of once-familiar relationships changed. Erstwhile friends were no more welcome. Those long deemed potential enemies became, to the contrary, friends. In the postcommunist universe of meaning, practically everyone moved from one position to another, sometimes distant and even opposite to the one occupied before. Though many moves were structurally similar e.
Russia, Serbia, and, to a lesser degree, Czech Republic appeared in this category. Sometimes, a nation is too close to separate successfully. At the same time, ethno-democratic regimes in Latvia and Estonia successfully incorporated nationalism into the body politic and have not shied away from discrimination against ethnic Russians and Russophones, while playing the specter of the Russian threat to prop up their NATO applications. The Russian-Ukrainian relations are truly ambivalent, whether we look at them from the Ukrainian or the Russian side.
The result is as controversial as mutual perceptions of each other. Subjective histories should therefore be taken seriously and complement the factual analysis presented. At its peak, circa the mid-twelfth century, Kievan Rus extended from the Carpathian mountains and the Black Sea in the south-west to the White Sea in the north-east, thus including about two-thirds of what later became Ukraine and most of present-day Belarus. The political organization and culture of the early Rus were shaped in interaction with a number of neighboring peoples, of which Turkic tribes Khazars, Pechenegs and Scandinavians Varangians were among the more important.
Whether the Varangians or the Khazars created the state centered in Kiev is of little consequence from the point of the subsequent Histor y of an Uneasy Relationship 61 historical and cultural development that did not make Rus a part of Sweden or put a North Germanic, or any other, language in place of the heretofore spoken Slavic dialects. By the time the legal code Pravda Russkaia was written eleventh century A. Ukrainian and Russian historiographies generally disagree on several points regarding the political and ethnic origins of Kievan Rus and even more importantly, its political and ethno-cultural legacies.
One theme underlying these disagreements is that of continuity, another is that of belonging. If history is looked upon as unbroken continuity, the search for ancestral homelands is inevitable. Rus culture made creative use of the Byzantine literary tradition, contemporary European styles in architecture, icon painting and applied arts.
Local folklore, music, popular theater and so on resembled their West European counterparts much more than those of neighboring nomadic tribes of the East. The claim is politically important, since it allows even a distant successor state to bolster its international image, posing as a rightful member of the European family of nations. The implications for policy are numerous: from arguing for most-favored-nation status in trade to pressing for full membership in the European Union and NATO.
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Nationalist myths of belonging, though based on the attempt to appropriate the past, are fully addressed to the present and the future. Ukraine then may have a place in a NATO-based security system in Europe, whereas Russian participation is uncertain at best. The debate over ancestral homelands with its parallel claims of belonging does not have to be a zero-sum game. The written language of the epoch is equidistant from modern Russian, Ukrainian, and Belarusian.
Though Riurikid princes continued to rule their former domains, the ultimate sovereignty now rested with the khans. Let us look at these two issues in turn. The earlier the state appears, the better for the nation. The Russian-Ukrainian relationship after the rise of Muscovy is accordingly presented as a continuous tutelage of stateless Ukrainians by statist Russians. Of the three, only the latter survived and led the struggle to reunite the lands of the old Rus into a single state governed from Moscow.
No ready-made answer is available. It is obvious, though, that a number of factors were at play here. The relative remoteness of the northern hinterland saved Great Novgorod from destruction, thus preserving a strategically located and open-to-foreign-trade economic base. A few years later, his successor moved to Moscow, which hosted the metropolitan residence until metropolitanate was succeeded by the Russian Patriarchy at the end of the sixteenth century.
Notwithstanding claims of the rival bishops in Lithuania, Moscow hierarchs continued to assert their right to exercise spiritual guidance and authority over the Orthodox believers throughout the former Rus lands. On several occasions, Russian czars tried to win allegiance of the Zaporozhian Cossacks—the freelance warriors of the Ukraine steppe—by sending them gifts, money, and supplies.
Migration of Ukrainians into the Russian borderlands was encouraged and indeed acquired mass proportions by the mid-seventeenth century.
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The old Rus aristocracy was gradually Polonized, being forced to abandon Orthodoxy for Catholicism. The newly imposed serfdom was for all legal purposes tantamount to slavery: no external validation was required, for example, if a lord decided to put a serf to death. For many, escape to borderlands that were scarcely populated and hardly controlled by any state was the only viable option. Among the Cossacks, everyone was free and had a chance to rise in ranks. This was a society of freebooters and mercenaries that accepted disgruntled nobles and runaway serfs alike.
On occasion, the ad hoc armed expeditions attracted people from both camps. By the mid-seventeenth century, their position became particularly precarious due to the campaign to expand Polish landownership into previously unoccupied territories. Grossly abused peasantry waited for little more than a signal to start rioting that very soon engulfed Ukraine on both sides of the Dnieper. According to this interpretation, the Russian-Ukrainian agreement buried presumably close prospects for independent Ukrainian statehood. Less dramatic interpretations insist on the temporary and provisional character of the union, variously describing it as a military alliance, a personal union of two leaders, a protectorate, a vassalage and so on.
Cossacks secured a de facto command of local government and administration, including tax collection, litigation, and adjudication. First hetmans were also able directly to conduct negotiations with foreign powers, which led some of them away from Muscovy and into the embrace of its enemies. By the end of the eighteenth century, the Cossack stronghold in the Zaporozhian Sich was destroyed, and the Cossack self-administration fully replaced by the imperial bureaucracy.
The new imperial domains were subjected to political and administrative streamlining that eliminated such vestiges of the old autonomy as the Magdeburg Law, enjoyed by many western Ukrainian cities since medieval ages. The use of the Russian language was promoted in schools for the nobility and in provincial administration.
While Russians formed the core of the imperial nation, Ukrainians had no separate state of their own. They began to write the history of the Empire and its predecessors as a Russian national history. Their nineteenth-century historians had taught the Russians to look at the Empire as the national state of the Russians. Additionally, the referenced state, in the Russian case, was an autocratic monarchy, with a result that the modern notion of citizenship was as alien to it as the modern idea of ethnicity.
All loyal subjects of certain social standing could have equal career opportunities. Ukrainians were obviously not excluded, and neither were Kazakhs, Tatars, Georgians, and others. On the other hand, the vast majority of the core Russian ethnie peasants had no chance to play any formative role in the nation building until very late into modernity. Many chose to side with the Empire, building on the statist notion of nationality.
The others had to rely on idealized memories and reinterpretations of history. The myth created by descendants of the assimilated Cossack starshyna played a notable role in the early formulation of the idea of Little Russian uniqueness. His political ideas went much farther than liberal constitutionalism, cultural autonomy, and the Slavic Federation preached by Kostomarov. He squarely blamed both real and alleged misfortunes of the Ukrainian people on the Russian czars and Muscovites in general. The mass audience there remained essentially Little Russian—that is, parochial and largely conservative—in its response to the populist message.
The imperial bureaucracy learned to take Ukrainian separatism seriously. Valuyev prohibited publication of textbooks and popular education literature in Ukrainian. The reasons behind the linguistic policing were mostly geopolitical. In the Ukrainian movement, the czar government saw only overt manifestation of an externally sponsored conspiracy that, if successful, would reverse the settlement brought by the Partitions of Poland.
Because Russia remained an empire with no clear border separating its core from the external periphery, the core Russian ethnie could not boast comparable achievements. Ethno-national growth of the Great Russians, or Russians proper, was retarded. The idea was inherited by the Soviets and resurfaced again after the end of the Soviet power. On the Ukrainian side, a parallel myth of unredeemable Russian animosity toward Ukraine and Ukrainians used structurally similar psychological displacement to equate certain policies of the imperial establishment with the Russian popular attitudes at large.
The struggle continued after the breakup of the Empire. Initially, populists, who sought political and cultural autonomy for Ukraine within democratized and federated Russia, dominated the stage. Subsequent polarization between national separatists and socialists brought most of the latter into the all-Russian camp of already established groups of a similar ideological persuasion. While socialists had to pay tribute to the ideas of proletarian internationalism, the relatively low priority they learned to place on the national cause per se came to be balanced with increased radicalism of the separatists.
The situation was even more complicated in Ukraine. Power was distributed between the local bodies of the Provisional Government, the soviets that sprang up in the cities, and the autonomist government of the Central Rada. The promise of a long-awaited land reform helped Rada to win over peasants. The October Revolution began. Mass support waned when it became obvious that the promise of the land was not to be heeded. Not Russian but Ukrainian regiments took Kiev later for the Bolsheviks. Headed by V. Vynnychenko and S. By that time, Ukraine was embroiled in anarchy.
The newly established state of Poland laid a claim to the RightBank Ukraine and started a war that eventually brought Petliura into the Polish camp. The Bolsheviks appeared the only force capable of bringing order into the ravaged country and throwing out both foreign invaders and local strongmen. While it may be true that their victory was largely determined by the ability to master an overwhelming military strength,45 there should be no confusion as to the fact that a sizeable part of the Bolshevikcommanded forces consisted of ethnic Ukrainians and other local loyalists.
Whether the roots of the Ukrainian Soviet government were Russian or Ukrainian in origin remains a disputed issue. It was given the Crimea under Khrushchev. If the Caucasus will be given under Brezhnev, the geopolitical dream [of the Ukrainian devotees] will come true in reality. Yet, a change did occur not only in the social and political realm, but also in the national realm. The old political system was dismantled and the new one put in its place. The threat of occupation by external powers was aggravated by the civil war inside the country.
Political, economic, social, and national tasks were to be solved simultaneously, and the state element in both Russia and Ukraine had to be asserted against forces of anarchy and self-serving factional struggle. But who said that only successful revolutions count? The party was to remain a singular structure of political authority that would override parochial impulses of the federation units. As a result, Ukraine lost the right to independently conduct foreign relations and foreign trade, to have its own armed forces, or to control the national economy and the communication system.
All major functions of the government were to be executed under direct supervision of the respective all-Union bodies. To the latter, it gave formal recognition of national existence, the trappings of statehood, and a working model of at least some power sharing between the center in Moscow and the subcenter in Kiev. There is a timelessness. We need to spend time with our pets and create a presence with them. The yogic philosophy of being present and compassionate translates to the way we interact not only with one another but also with our pets, she says. So her yoga influences the way she interacts with her dog.
Now she and I both like it. Drye wanted to share the inspiration with the Asheville community. In the warmer months, she guides a group of up to 20 students to various locations, including Max Patch and Black Balsam, where they hike and practice yoga. Students bring their furry companions to romp around with one another during the hike, and when Drye leads the hourlong yoga practice, the owners enjoy meditating on their mats while the dogs frolic among the leaves and sunshine.
Or just lie around and relax. Kate Lundquist is a freelance writer and yoga teacher living in Asheville. The national number is 19 percent. However, when it comes to the number of high school students who smoke, North Carolina made some strides: Since the funding was cut in North Carolina in , these tobacco use rates are likely to increase. In other promising news, since the passage of the statewide Smoke-Free Restaurants and Bars Law went into effect January , heart-attack rates have decreased 21 percent.
States can accelerate their efforts to save lives and reduce tobacco-related health care costs. Reconnective Healing spectrum is comprised of the full healing and evolutionary continuum of energy, light and information and has brought about unparalleled worldwide reports of healings from serious afflictions including:. Bioregional, hands-on programs with a focus on medicine making, botany, plant identification, wild foods and a blend of traditional and modern herbal medicine New classes start in March !
Asheville, NC www. Discover Yoga as a Healing Art. Join us at either location. The year-old was diagnosed with Acute Lymphoblastic Leukemia in the fall and is currently undergoing treatments at Mission Health. Helen Hall. The event is a friendly way to encourage community members to join local heroes and perform a heroic duty of their own. All presenting donors at the blood drive will. To set up your donation, visit redcrossblood. Medicine Group, P. This event will take place on flat to moderately rolling terrain with Hutch Mountain as the scenic backdrop, and features a Grand Prix-sanctioned 10K course.
It helps kids avoid, reverse and prevent health concerns associated with obesity — including diabetes, high blood pressure, asthma, heart disease and sleep apnea. Kid Power also teaches about the lifelong benefits of exercise and healthy eating through a specially designed curriculum. Participants can register online at prhfrostbite.
Morning walk-in clinic, Same day appointments, Late hours and Weekend hours. Haywood Pediatrics welcomes the opportunity to be the medical home for your children. David T. We carry an assortment of products for your mental, physical and spiritual wellbeing. Call Rick Bayless at How We Identify will be held Friday, Feb. In celebration of health and wellness, we are offering. I get courteous, professional service with great follow-up. They have gone to great lengths to keep me scheduled and rescheduled for appointments.
Anyone can enjoy this peaceful, energizing state through a simple technique that uses the natural connection of mind and body…. We now know that our every thought and emotion impacts every cell and organ in our body. We can use this harmonize and rejuvenate. Offering intelligent and soulful counseling that inspires you to improve your nutrition choices and habits for life. Free Introductory Talk: Thursdays. Happy Body, Hendersonville Rd. French Broad Food Coop, Asheville. Info: ashevillecommunityyoga. A parenting group will be held during kids yoga.
Info: www. Please RSVP: csalinda daoisttraditions. Appointments requested, but. Happy Body yoga Studio Hendersonville Road. Donations support Happy Body's outreach program. Group sessions tailored to the participants' individual needs. Registration required: www. Registration required: , ext. All levels. Free; donations accepted. Registration required: Registration required. Open to people with diabetes and their caregivers. Info and locations: LBrown fbca.
Free; registration required. Info: A Qigong form, developed at the Shanghai Institute of Qigong, that combines movement, breath and focusing on an image. Info: ednsue74 earthlink. Appointment and ID required for blood drives. Landon Ortiz. Free and open to the public. Brian T. Learn how to release pain, tension and stress from the body and find more happiness.
Hosted by Nourish. It connects us with the natural world, improving physical, mental and spiritual awareness. Info: heathercohen16 hotmail. Everyone welcome; no age or gender restrictions. Info: babeo yahoo. More than 33 groups are available in the WNC area.
Entrance near Charlotte Street. All women welcome. Donations accepted but not required. Info: nicerhugs gmail. Meeting will feature light Tai Chi exercises. Donations accepted. Co-dependentS anonyMouS A fellowship of men and women whose common purpose is to develop healthy relationships. Info: anyword mindspring. We strive to provide support, acceptance, information and socialization, plus tips and techniques to manage challenges.
Info: magneticminds. Justice St. Info and directions: Must be 18 years or older and on the autism spectrum. Info: robinplemmons gmail. Enter through side parking lot.
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A step program. State St. Open relapse and recovery meeting. Info: smartrecoveryavl gmail. Facilitated by licensed professionals. Dropins welcome; no registration required. Info and directions: www. Calendar deadline The deadline for free and paid listings is 5 p. The training prepares volunteers to act as support and friend for someone who is ill or disabled and isolated. Typically, those helped generally have more than one medical issue and have few outside contacts. Volunteers are asked to commit to at least one hour a week for six months to ensure continuity to those served by the program.
Volunteers will learn about active listening, family dynamics, defusing anger, Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act rules and more. More often, volunteers act as friends, with such activities as going to lunch or a movie, visiting a museum or taking a walk. The Feb. For more information, visit wncha. Go to www. Chickening for current and potential chicken owners. Due to the abundance of great things to do in our area, we only have the space in print to focus on timely events. Our print calendar now covers an eight-day range. For a complete directory of all Community Calendar groups and upcoming events, please visit www.
If you wish to submit an event for Clubland our free live music listings , please e-mail clubland mountainx. Please limit your submission to 40 words or less. Call , ext. To submit a paid listing, send it to our Classified Department by any of the following methods. Be sure to include your phone number, for billing purposes. Call our Classified Department at , ext. King St. Highway , Nebo. Refreshments served. Tucker Cooke Gallery. On display at First Citizens Bank, N. Free or by donation.
Call to confirm dates. Programs are free with admission unless otherwise noted. Free first Wednesdays from pm. Hours: Tues. Bella ViSta art gallery 14 Lodge St. Winter hours: Mon. Open daily from 9am6pm. Haen gallery 52 Biltmore Ave. Lexington Ave. Hours: Mon. Festivities will include a home brewers competition and tasting, a second line parade and masked costume ball. Info: svfal. Caldwell St. Keep the music going at a benefit show and cornbread cook-off on Sunday, Feb. Free to attend. Light refreshments available.
Jordan St. Info: info haywoodarts. Wheelchair N. Info and registration: www. Info: mrshyattsmusichouse gmail. Proceeds benefit the asheville Buncombe Community Christian Ministry. Info: csbassett hotmail. Proceeds benefit the renovation of Hazel Robinson Amphitheatre. Proceeds benefit the museum. Pack Square. Computer basics class or familiarity with keyboard and mouse required.
Info and registration: Info: or www. Registration requested. Bring Social Security card, tax return, W-2 forms, etc. Pack Memorial Library, 67 Haywood St. Dougherty St. Have fun and learn to play pool in the weekly pool league. Class time is - am. Quilt in a SHoeBox pd. Info: ashevillequiltguild. A great opportunity for women new to the area to make lasting friends, explore the surroundings and enrich their lives. Contact us! Learn how to increase traffic to your WordPress website. We will focus on creating meaningful content that can be organized with helpful meta data, including keyword, tags, titles and descriptions.
Info and registra-. Afternoon Sessions. Complete program. See website for details. Larchmont Drive. Children's club meets from pm. See website for stargazing events. Weekly meetings held at Asheville. Jones Library. Info: library brevard. Studio zaHiya pd. Friday pm Kids Zumba. Lexington Avenue. Info: jobs brevard. Info and cost: Walnut St. Eleven on Grove, downtown Asheville. Dance apprenticeships for teens and adults available. Comfortable, informal dress. Open to ages 11 and above. Held at Harvest House, Kenilworth Road. Free for beginners.
Info: dancing. Trees will be available for pickup Feb. Where: Satellite Gallery, 55 Broadway St. When: Saturday, Feb.
Opening reception: Saturday, Feb. Why: You've probably seen art by Open Hearts Art Center's adults with developmental, mental, physical and emotional disabilities around town. The show is more than a chance to see some of the most creative and eclectic work around. It's also a benefit for the Open Hearts Art Center, which "provides the unique opportunity for differently-abled adults to express themselves using a variety of creative avenues. An opening reception will be held Saturday, Feb. Expect a lively evening with enthusiastic artists and anyone who loves "expression in its purest form.
Weaver Blvd. Held in Cannon Lounge. Caldwell St, Brevard. Full bar and menu available. Info: msp. A screening of the local indie film Golden Blade 3 will follow Braxton's presentation. Info: DBraxton9 yahoo. Hinds University Center. Info: mchamber wcu. Merrimon Ave. Free food and admission. Info and registration: dsaccone ymcawnc. Broyhill Civic Center, featuring pork loin, cherry crumble.
Info: lindsey. Register in person or by phone: Held on A-B Tech's Enka campus. Info: beckisbounty gmail. Three dashes indicate the next listing. For more information, including the exact start and end dates of markets, contact the Appalachian Sustainable Agriculture Project. Mitchell Ave. SMall terrain Haywood Road. Info and registration: tomcoulson aol. Ages Info and registration: alawing carolinaday. Engineering and tech professionals are invited to mentor participants. Info: brookside att. Parental participation encouraged.
Info: bearberry charter. HandS on! This children's museum is located at N. Meet teachers, parents and administrators and tour the campus. Pre-K-8th grade, 10am-noon; 9thth grade, noon-2pm. Sponsored by Smart Start. Info and registration:. All ages. Free with museum admission. Info: or lindan49 charter. Weekdays: pm; weekends and holidays: 9am-5pm. Asheville, NC Guests welcome. Contact: www. Ages 9 and above. Bring a drum. All instruments welcome. Held at First Presbyterian. One coupon per table. Church of Weaverville, 30 Alabama Ave.
Info: michael. Cellular Center. Tickets and info: www. Blue ridge orCHeStra Info: www. Call for confirmation. No need to bring bikes. Please do not bring bikes. Programs are free unless otherwise noted. Robinson Administration Building, will host a bluegrass concert and jam featuring Whitewater Bluegrass Co. Info: ww. Info: olliasheville. Info: music. Held in Lipinsky Auditorium. Info: humanities. Held in the Reuter.
Held in the Manheimer Room. Held in Lipinsky auditorium. Held in the Reuter Center. A book signing will immediately follow. Licensed counselor and accredited professional astrologer uses your chart when counseling for additional insight into yourself, your relationships and life directions. Readings also available. FEB th. Learn to hold unconditioned presence for.
Dynamic group format supports presencing open awareness in a deep inquiry process.
Jerry www. We practice Insight Meditation, also known as: Vipassana, or Mindfulness Meditation, which cultivates a happier, more peaceful, and focused mind. Our caring community environment provides added support and joy to one's spiritual awakening processes. Open to adults. By donation. Wednesdays, 7pmpm. Sundays, 10ampm. Meditation, Dhamma talk, and discussion. Free introduction to Insight or Mindfulness meditation.
Experience easy, wonderful practices that opens your life to the beauty within and connects you to your heart. A progressive program of higher learning and spiritual practice in the Kriya Yoga Tradition. Starting Tuesday Feb. Please call or visit www. We all long for sanity, compassion and inspiration in our lives. This program presents meditation as a way to contact our inherent dignity and wakefulness. Feb Meets downtown monthly. Info and location: stevenmitch charter.
Chanting this once-secret name for God, HU, has helped people throughout time find inner peace and divine love. Restaurant prices apply. Classes include guided meditation, talk and discussion. Held at 24 Arlington St. Info: neals miracle. See website for. Sw pm - Manga-drawing class. Info and locations: He looks for people who are responsible, timely, self-motivated and strong communicators. We spoke with four local entrepreneurs, asking how they did it and what advice they can offer. To the surprise of many, this foundation is mainly internal — knowing who you are, doing what you love and overcoming some key internal obstacles that might be holding you back.
Sajit Greene, an Ashevillearea business and relationship coach, finds that lack of confidence is an obstacle for many solopreneurs, and it often takes the form of a loud and bossy inner critic. Instead of letting it beat you down, you can use it as a tool for discernment or constructive feedback. But I had to Offer valid at participating locations shown below. Valid on arrangements and dipped fruit boxes only. Offer code must be used when placing order. Arrangements available in a variety of sizes. Containers may vary. Delivery not available in all areas.
Cannot be combined with any other offer, promotion, coupon or coupon letlaws. Excludes tax and delivery. Not valid on previously purchased items. All rights reserved. Of course, moving through inner obstacles is an ongoing journey, and as a business owner continues to grow, new obstacles may arise. Justin Belleme, owner of JB Media Group, went from solo, freelance online-marketing consultant to nine-employee Internet marketing agency. For him, the catalyst for growth was one big client. Cannot be combined with any other offer, promotion, coupon or coupon.
Acceptance and use of coupon is subject to all applicable laws. Void where prohibited. The thought of sharing the workload can actually induce panic in some new smallbusiness owners. Remember those internal obstacles? You have to start drawing the line between the emotional connection and the business entity.
The key is to hire the right people, give them the proper training, and to not micromanage them. And based on that, we would adjust our product line for the coming year. Applications are due Thursday, Feb. To apply, visit mountainbizworks. For more information, visit mountainbizworks. Anna Raddatz is development and communications coordinator at Mountain BizWorks.
Ages months. Jackson St. Events are free, unless otherwise noted. Free, unless otherwise noted. Bring pen, paper and a few pages of prose you're currently working on. Reservations recommended. Info: ronald ymail. Info and location: Music provided by Chris Rosser. Info: jay. Kids half-mile fun run begins at 9am.
Held at the Fairview Community. HenderSonVille little tHeatre S. Washington St. Visit lovintenders. Logo pictured. Center, Charlotte Highway. Info: recprograms townofwaynesville. Info and departure location: halfmarathon. Free with membership or daily admission. Performing Arts Collective presents Neighbors, the story of "a liberal white couple who decide to sell their house to an affluent black couple. Downtown location: South Main St. Stage CoMpany Info: www. The organization matches children from singleparent homes with adult mentors.
Volunteers 18 and older are also needed to share outings in the community twice a month with youth from single-parent homes. Activities are free or lowcost. Information sessions will be held feb. Must be 21 years or older. Volunteer for one hour a week and change the life of a local child.
Visit the website to sign up for a project. Supplies provided. Info: , ext.
Tutors provide oneon-one or small group instruction to adults in our community. No prior tutoring experience required. Tutors will receive 15 hours of training as well as ongoing support from certified professionals. Info: literacytutors litcouncil. A commitment of eight hours per month required. Info: partnersunlimited juno. Gilliland, 54, served four years in prison in the s for sexually assaulting his ex-wife, but his congregation nonetheless defended him. Another said, "It was probably the worst feeling I ever had in my life. State regulations require that asbestos known to cause deadly respiratory ill-.
On closer inspection, however, it turned out to be one of the manufacturer's "Super Star Series. He started the business two years ago with the idea of selling "Christian" shoes containing water in the soles so wearers could walk on water. In addition, 36 local officials have been charged with sexual assault, according to India's Association for Democratic Reforms. In December, the association reported that of the lower house of Parliament's members currently face criminal charges.
The phones lack sophisticated tracking features, and a buried "privacy" mode gives off only stealth signals when lovers call and leaves no trace of calls, texts or emails. Clients are generally held accountable for their lawyers' errors because the lawyers are their "agents. Wade Johnson an often-incapacitated methamphetamine addict , missed a filing deadline, Smith lost the right to appeal.
The case is now before the U. Supreme Court. Alabama is also the only state whose judges can overrule juries and impose the death penalty instead of life in prison. Send items to weirdnews earthlink. During the Republican primaries, Mitt Romney famously asserted a corporation's general right under the law to be treated as a person. The state law, the judge ruled, was intended only to reduce traffic congestion, and driving with no passenger except corporate papers is unrelated to that goal.
He reported trouble only once when, training in the mountains, he was shot at by a hunter who mistook him for a wild boar. The bars have closed, and the revelers have gone home to bed. Bridges has just finished breakfast, and he's on his way to work. That's the tricky thing about the bakery: Its operations are so cyclical, so steady and repetitive, that time stops making sense.
It's like a wormhole where fermenting dough, rising loaves and romantic aromas take on their own rhythm and defy business hours. Today, it has three locations, employs about 50 people and produces between 1, and 1, pounds of dough per day in addition to sundry pastries, cookies and sandwiches.
During busy times, he might pass the night baker, Beth Sollars, on her way out the door. When the demand for bread is lower, Beth leaves a few hours before Eric gets in, so he might spend an hour or two in solitude working the ovens before his coworkers arrive. Photos by Max cooper. The design of the instrument is simple and functional, as if it were an artifact from the early days of baking. A couple of pastry workers prepare the day's cookies and cupcakes on the other side of the kitchen. The delivery drivers ready to leave with a load of bread for the Waynesville location the baking for all three stores happens on Biltmore Avenue.
All of this, of course, depends on the particular kind of bread. Even though they work at the same time, Bridges and Bardyn occupy opposite ends of the breadmaking process. The rising of the dough depends on the temperature of the room. When the weather swings from 30 degrees to 60 degrees in the course of a week, Bardyn has to make carefully calibrated adjustments to the dough. His unconventional sleep schedule means he eats four small meals throughout the day.
As the day rolls on, the bake continues. Bridges could get off as early as 8 a. During the slow season, he signs up for delivery shifts that keep him busy until mid-afternoon. At noon, Bardyn continues to mix the dough. He transfers the mass of dough, which resembles a gelatinous pillow, from the mixer to the bucket in an impressive balancing act.
It's like he's cupping water in his hands, only the dough is much heavier. They form an assembly line around the massive kitchen table and portion out the dough for bagels, bread and rolls. Daniel Rosener weighs out the proper portions on a mechanical scale. Each of his hands remains busy with an entirely different action: one tends the scale while the other pinches and pulls dough from the main mass to add to the weighted portion.
Rosener slings the weighed portion to Naomi Talmer, who deftly negotiates it into a loaf shape. Her hands read the surface of the dough; she likely could do this work in the dark. As the dough comes together, she shuffles it in faster and faster circles until, suddenly, the blob she received from Rosener is a perfect, balanced loaf shape. Every ounce of the dough is shaped by hand. On busy days, that means the shapers handle almost 2 tons of the stuff. Around 5 p. Bardyn and Dennehy have made a mad dash for home. The bakery has a way of pulling people in, Bardyn explains.
Even on his off days, he stops by to see how the bake is coming along. Sollars begins her shift with sandwich loaves, which — unlike the boules, baguettes and ciabatta — bake in pans. She pulls them from the refrigerator and lets them warm up to room temperature before she loads them into the oven.
She fills the oven one shelf at a time, so by the time she loads it, only a few minutes remain before she begins checking on the progress of the loaves she put in first. In her down time, she organizes the remaining dough and packages rolls for the 5 a. Her workday could end as early as 10 p. The bake goes on Bridges, Bardyn and Dennehy say the bakery transformed them from night to morning people. Its gravity pulled them. Even though it demands relentless consistency, it offers a certain kind of solace.
Bardyn explains that the bakery appeals to his personal work ethic. Top: Naomi Talmer coaxes a ball of dough into a loaf shape. Photo by Yeager St. We purchase fresh produce directly from local farmers and offer a local special every day! Mahler teaches four-hour lessons for groups of about a dozen students. They prepare a three-course meal of traditional french dishes. The open space is set on a hill with a wall-sized window that overlooks Merrimon Avenue, just north of Beaver Lake.
The wooden beams that decorate the ceiling are reminiscent of a french cottage. The dining table is playfully grand, painted gold and illuminated by a chandelier. The culinary get-togethers make good date nights, Mahler says. Eventually, she was cooking for private households based on the skills she learned at home. She hopes her classes will encourage families to take time to cook and eat together. Eating togEthEr: The school hopes to preserve the tradition of family dinners and the camaraderie that they allow. To sign up, visit mabellefrance. To talk more with Mahler about her classes, look for her at the Asheville City Markets in the haywood Park atrium and in Biltmore Park, where she sells tarts and other prepared goods.
Ma Belle france is also on facebook. Diners, along with a panel of judges, vote on the winner, who moves on to the next round. This year, 16 chefs will compete at Chestnut restaurant downtown. The preliminary round and the quarterfinals happen every Tuesday from feb. Later in the summer, the final rounds take place, leading up to the Asheville Wine and food festival on Aug. A portion of the proceeds benefits Eliada, a nonprofit that provides counseling and child care services.
The competing chefs come from fine dining eateries and casual joints alike. Each challenge required him to cook three courses using a quirky secret ingredient, including pork, chocolate and Mountain Dew, and beef and Texas Pete hot Sauce. The regional contest takes place on April The winner of that round advances to the statewide final fire competition in raleigh. When Jason roy talks about biscuits, he means cat heads — so called for their size. Biscuit head will serve quick, hearty, biscuit-centric meals, featuring counter service and a selfserve jam bar. Jason is the chef at Lexington Avenue Brewery, and Carolyn works the bar.
With Biscuit head, they want to create a family business that. Their 8-year-old son, Cameron, is also excited about the venture. The roys will combine the best of both of their backgrounds to create the menu; Carolyn hails from Lancaster, Pa. Amish country , and Jason grew up in Georgia. There will be plenty of attractions for adults, too. The roys hope to open Biscuit head just in time for patio weather.
Open 7 days a week! Blackshaw also heads The eatery will benefit from extended hours, opening at 11 a. Monday through Saturday, and a new menu focused on appetizers, sandwiches and salads. The venue will continue to support musicians as part of its mission.
Also get the chance to celebrate your love twice by winning free dinner for two drawing. Good vs. Wheat germ? Maybe tomorrow. Granola bars fall squarely in the good-to-be-bad category. Sometimes you need an excuse to eat something sweet with no guilt. In that spirit, Post-Consumer Pantry offers two granola bar recipes, one with wheat germ and no refined sugar and the other with dark chocolate, cherry and coconut. Just whip up a batch at home on a quiet Sunday afternoon and enjoy a healthy or not-so-healthy snack all week long.
In a separate bowl, mix butter, honey and vanilla. Pour into pan and use a spatula to pat it down. Bake minutes. Let cool completely before cutting into rectangles. Grease inch baking dish. Spread oatmeal, almonds and coconut on a cookie sheet. Bake minutes, stirring occasionally Pour oat mixture into a large mixing bowl and add wheat germ.
Grease a 9x9 pan. Mix oats, flour, brown sugar, salt, cherries, almonds, coconut and chocolate chips. Melt butter, honey, brown sugar, vanilla and salt in a small saucepan and bring to a boil. Pour over toasted oatmeal mixture. Add dried fruit and stir. Pour into pan and pat down with spatula. Got a whole lotta love? Be a part of our Valentine Issue! Advertise your romantic specials or send a public valentine to your client base. Declare your Asheville Love to the world. Asheville NC www. At p. More info at ashevillemardigras. The shop is throwing a big bash for fat Tuesday, feb.
Many of the surrounding businesses have pitched in prizes for a raffle. Proceeds benefit the garden at the nearby hall fletcher Elementary. Coffee, hanks BBQ and more. There will also be beer, wine, live. The event takes place from 5 p. Short Street Cakes is located at haywood road. Want to keep the party going? Around the corner, the Double Crown is hosting a Mardi Gras party with live music, drink specials, king cake and New orleans flair. Upcycling the word is jargony. Where recycling means breaking something down, upcycling means adding value to a used object by embellishing, repurposing or transforming it.
Henry Ford even practiced an early form of upcycling, using the crates car parts were shipped in as vehicle floorboards.